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Abstract 
 
[[[ (Here only the chapters 3 – 8, see ***) First I argue that the prohibition of linguistic self-
reference as a solution to the antinomy problem contains a pragmatic contradiction and is thus not 
only too restrictive, but just inconsistent (chap.1). Furthermore, the possibilities of non-restrictive 
strategies for antinomy avoidance are discussed, whereby the explicit inclusion of the – pragmati-
cally presuposed – consistency requirement proves to be the optimal strategy (chap.2). ]]] The cen-
tral question here is that about the actual reason for antinomic structures. It turns out to be a form of 
negative self-conditioning (chap.3). This makes it necessary to clarify the status of negative con-
cepts (chap.4). The generalization of these considerations (chap.5) leads to the actual analysis of the 
antinomic basic structure (chap.6): Decisively for the pragmatics of the concept is that it positively 
owns a meaning, so that positivity is always constituted by the concept qua concept. Thus a negative 
concept is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence: From a semantic point of view it has nega-
tive character, in its pragmatic status as a concept, however, it has positive character. If the meaning 
is especially that of a negative self-reference, the ambivalence leads to the antinomic constellation 
of a negative self-condition – that is the crux of the matter here! The concept thus possesses the pro-
perty defined by it exactly when it does not possess it and vice versa. A closer analysis shows that 
the function of reflective structures for the occurrence of antinomies has to be judged much more 
differentiated than previous opinions suggest. Not only are four forms of reflectivity to be distingu-
ished in this context – ontic, semantic, pragmatic reflectivity, and especially the form of negative 
self-condition; but it is also apparent that these are intertwined with each other in a way that is diffi-
cult to be understood. The astonishing variety of relationships associated with this makes the irrita-
tion that has always emanated from the antinomy problem appear more comprehensible. In the de-
veloped pragmatic perspective furtheron parallels to the structure of self-consciousness become vi-
sible (chap.7). I conclude with considerations about the significance of the antinomic structure for 
the problem of dialectics, especially for the synthesis formation of mutually exclusive terms 
(chap.8). 
 
 
 
3.*** Analysis of antinomic structures 
 
Up to now, it has been assumed that antinomies occur in certain cases, and the question was 
how to prevent this type of structure. The reason for the emergence of antinomies remained in the 
dark, and, strictly speaking, antinomies really have been understood only as contradictions resulting 
from faulty definitions. But undoubtedly not every contradiction as such is antinomic. In the follo-
wing, therefore, an analysis of the specifically antinomic structures and of the very reason of their 
occurrence will be undertaken, whereby, as will become apparent, also pragmatic aspects of fun-
damental importancewill be revealed. 
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In order to clarify what the specific antinomic structures are in comparison to simple contra-
dictions, let us first look at the following example (the so-called 'Grelling antinomy'): If the term 
'non-self-referential' itself possesses the property 'non-self-referential' which it means, its meaning 
also applies to itself, and it thus has the property 'self-referential', in contrast to the assumption. If it 
is then assumed that the term 'non-self-referential' has the property 'self-referential', its meaning 
does not apply to it; it therefore has the property 'non-self-referential', again contrary to the assump-
tion. Each of the two possible assumptions – non-self-reference or self-reference – has as a result 
the opposite of the respective assumption, generally: asuming the validity of A implies the validity 
of non-A; assuming the validity of non-A implies the validity of A. The astonishing point is that 
with the validity of one of the two limbs the validity of the respective other is also involved. In con-
trast to the formal contradiction 'A and non-A',1 in the antinomic case both limbs are obviously true, 
which would amount to the curiosity of a true contradiction. This question will be discussed later 
(chapters 6 and 8). The characterized antinomic implication can first be interpreted simply as a se-
quence,2 in the sense of a sequence of alternating steps, so that the opposites are now assigned to 
different steps and the aporia of a true contradiction is thus provisionally averted. 
The specified antinomic condition structure is known as vicious circle, and in fact von Kut-
schera has shown that antinomies are generally based on such circularities.3 The condition structure 
represented by the vicious circle can be characterized as a negative self-condition. This means that 
whatsoever is conditioned it is again a condition of its opposite, etc. This mechanism of continuous 
self-cancellation can be illustrated plausibly by a non-linguistic model from the so-called 'logic of 
circuits':4 In a feeding-back negation circuit, as it is technically used e.g. as a self-acting interrupter, 
a constant oscillation between opposite switching states takes place: The switching impulse opens a 
switch and thus interrupts itself; the switch closes again and anew gives a switching impulse, which 
opens it, etc. The example also shows that the vicious circle is not only meaningless, but in certain 
contexts it is entirely of importance.5 In particular, this characterizes the antinomic basic structure. 
The mentioned sequence of alternating properties ('non-self-referential', 'self-referential' etc.) results 
from the repeated passing through the vicious circle. Each pass is the realization of a negative self-
condition and thus represents an 'act of reflection', which leads to a new stage of reflection. The lo-
gic of reflection developed by U. Blau (1985) undertakes it to make such structures visible and ac-
cessible for formal treatment. The admission of circular and thus unfounded expressions requires, as 
Blau explains, the introduction of six truth values at each level: besides true and false, also neutral 
(for vague and senseless contexts), open to circles and regresses, as well as non-true (where it is 
open whether false or neutral) and non-false (where it is open whether true or neutral).6 Blau now 
shows that antinomic entities assume different truth values on different levels of reflection, e.g. in 
the case of the truth antinomy: The proposition 'This proposition is false' has on the lowest level, he 
argues (e.g. 386 ff.), the truth value open, since it is undecidable due to its circularity. On the 2nd 
level it is then false, because it falsely assigns itself the truth-value false instead of open. On the 3rd 
level it is true, because it correctly asserts the falsity existing on the 2nd level. On the higher levels 
it oscillates constantly between true and false, but on each level it possesses a well-defined truth va-
                                                 
1 In contrast to T. Kesselring's view (1984, p. 98) it is completely irrelevant, if this conjunction or instead the 
equivalence A   A is considered, because both expressions are logically equivalent. 
2 Here a possible transition to a logic of time becomes visible. 
3 F. von Kutschera 1964, p. 51, 54 ff. 
4 Although this model belongs to a completely different realm of being, decisive is solely the possibility of repre-
senting certain relevant properties, here especially the structure of negative self-condition. Fundamental on the concept 
of the model see H. Stachowiak 1973, p. 131 ff. 
5 F. von Kutschera 1964, p. 54 f, sees only the semantic side when he disqualifies it as "meaningless". The tech-
nical function of 'feedback' is based on a circular structure as well as, for example, the 'self-fulfilling prophecy' and ob-
viously also the concept of ego (see chapter 7). 
6 U. Blau 1985, p. 370, 382 ff, 391 ff. Cf. also the contribution of U. Blau to PRAGMATIK IV. 
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lue.7 Unexplained, however, remains the reason for the occurrence of the negative self-condition ef-
fective here and the associated emergence of reflection stages. Blau's brief remarks on this point8 do 
not give a satisfying answer to this question. In the following I will develop an explanation of the 
antinomic mechanism and the oscillating behavior of antinomic predications. 
Responsible for the occurrence of antinomies is, as has been shown, a condition structure of 
the type of a negative self-condition. On the linguistic level it is realized as vicious circle. But what 
are the conditions of origin of such a structure? 
In the interesting work of T. Kesselring the existence of a negative self-relationship (sic: rela-
tionship!) has been named as the reason for the occurrence of antinomies.9 This does not seem im-
plausible with regard to concrete antinomies like that of Grelling, for which these two moments of 
negation and self-relationship are obviously met. As will be shown, both conditions are indeed ne-
cessary, because without them an expression does not become antinomic. On the other hand this 
characterization can not be sufficient, because the property of non-self-relationship, as also Kessel-
ring sees,10 is in most cases completely harmless. The term 'non-monosyllabic' for instance is nega-
tive and self-relating, but nevertheless not antinomic at all. Thus the criterion of negative self-
relationship is not selective; it does not give the specific conditions of antinomic structures. In the 
following it is to be shown, that not the property of negated self-relation as such, but the concept of 
non-self-reference in its self-application leads to antinomies. In order to demonstrate this, some cla-
rifications of the character of negative concepts are necessary. 
Let us consider the concept of non-materiality as an example of a negative concept. Eve-
rything non-material is in correspondence with this, whereas material things are not, with other 
words: If a negative concept ‹non-material›11 is used as a basis and the corresponding negative pro-
perty ('non-material') is related to it, this relation is characterized by 'correspondence', i.e. positive. If 
the negative concept ‹non-material› is referred to the opposite positive property ('material'), this re-
lation is characterized by 'non-correspondence', i.e. negative, in a schematic representation (where 
the reference term is put in angle brackets ‹...›, and '~~>' denotes the transition to a correspondence 
statement): 
 
 (3.1)  ‹non-material› : entity - non-material ~~>  corresponding 
 
(3.2)  ‹non-material› : entity - material ~~>  not-corresponding 
 
This signals: Correspondence concerning a reference concept (of whatever kind) is always 
something positive, and  non-correspondence is something negative. If the reference concept is in 
particular negative, then the negative property corresponding to it leads to a positive correspondence 
statement In case of a property non-corresponding to it leads to a negative correspondence state-
ment. So with a negative reference concept the correspondence statement of a property is generally 
characterized by a value reversal in comparison with the stated property, schematically (if only the 
valences are considered): 
 
(3.3)  reference-concept‹ – › : property(–)  ~~>   correspondence(+) 
 
(3.4)  reference- concept‹ – › : property(+)  ~~>   correspondence(–) 
                                                 
7 The stage-dependence of truth values can also be taken into the formulation of the truth antinomy ('This propo-
sition is not true on any stage'). In this way one obtains modified structures; U. Blau 1985, p. 388, 451 ff, speaks in this 
respect of the "boundless liar". In the meantime there is further "offspring": the "super liar" (R. Schüßler 1986). 
8 U. Blau 1985, p. 394 f. 
9 T. Kesselring 1984, p. 104 ff. 
10 T. Kesselring 1984, p. 105. 
11 If the concept character as such is thematic, in the following concepts are always put in angle brackets ‹...›. 
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The reason for this is obvious: A concept has a meaning, and this having is in any case so-
mething positive, and this positivity is reflected in the correspondence with the meaning of the con-
cept. A negative concept has a negative meaning, but this having is here something positive, too. 
Thus, a concept always constitutes positivity, and it is precisely for this reason that a negative con-
cept is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence: Contentwise it has a negative meaning, but 
formally its having-a-meaning is something positive. 
 The points that are important here can be characterized more closely in this way: Presupposed 
is a reference concept, furthermore an entity with its 'eigen-properties' ('Eigen-schaften'), which are 
now judged concerning their correspondence with the reference concept. Thus, the semantic aspect 
represented by the reference concept, the ontic aspect of an entity with certain eigen-properties and 
finally the pragmatic aspect of the judgement of correspondence have to be distinguished. The latter 
can be called 'pragmatic' insofar as it is not an inherent eigen-property of this entity, but the result of 
an judgement of its correspondence concerning an assumed reference concept. If e.g. a stone is as-
cribed the property of non-correspondence to the notion of a prime number, then it possesses this 
property only due to a reflection, so to speak, performed by the user of language on the correspon-
dence of the stone to the notion of prime number. Thus the correspondence-characteristic itself does 
not represent an ontic eigen-property, but a reflection-induced property of the concerning entity and 
in this respect has indeed pragmatic character.12 So the already used schematic representation can be 
generally characterized in this way:  
 
 (3.5)  ‹reference-concept›:  entity – eigen-property   ~~>    reflection property  
 
 
 
4. The antinomic basic structure 
 
A linguistic entity may be called self-corresponding if, due to its ontic eigen-properties, it is in 
correspondence with its own meaning, which here is the reference concept. E.g. the English word 
'multi-syllabic'  with the meaning ‹multi-syllabic› is itself multi-syllabic, therefore corresponding to 
itself – in schematic representation:  
 
(4.1)     ‹multi-syllabic›:      'multi-syllabic'      ~~>       self-corresponding 
 
 
 
Here the pragmatic reflection property characterizes a correspondence between the word form 
and the meaning associated with it. Accordingly the word 'monosyllabic' itself is not monosyllabic, 
it does not fall under its own meaning and is thus non-self-corresponding. 
If now in particular the term ‹not-self-corresponding› itself is chosen as reference concept, 
then the same considerations can be made as before. We have to clarify whether the word 'not-self-
corresponding' possesses the eigen-property 'not-self-corresponding' or not. Now, as is well known, 
each of these two possibilities has the opposite consequence (see above), so that a sequence of re-
flection-induced correspondences with continuous value reversals results: a form of negative self-
condition in linguistic realization and thus an antinomic structure. In the introduced schematic re-
presentation (where '/' is followed by correspondence properties; 'sc' stands for 'self-corresponding'; 
the beginning of the sequence with 'non-sc' is arbitrary, but due to the value inversion of the cor-
respondence conditions this is insignificant) it looks like this: 
 
                                                 
12 The pragmatic consequences of antinomic structures will be discussed in detail in chapter 6 and 7. 
(word / 
eigen-property) 
 
(word meaning) 
(pragmatic: 
reflection-induced 
correspondence term) 
 
(correspondence property) 
 
(semantic) 
 
(ontic) 
 5 
(4.2) word meaning ‹non-sc›: word form 'non-sc' /   non-sc  ~~>   sc  ~~>   non-sc  ~~>  ... 
 
How does it come to this?13 If, for the time being, it is assumed that 'sc' is an eigen-property of 
the word 'non-sc', then there is no correspondence with the reference concept ‹non-sc›, i.e. for the 
word 'non-sc' the reflection property 'non-sc' is ascertainable. If this reflection determination is now 
interpreted as a new eigen-property of 'non-sc', then there is a correspondence with the reference 
concept ‹non-sc› and thus a new reflection property 'sc', etc. Essential for this is apparently the re-
interpretation of a reflection property into an eigen-property of the considered entity. Only in this 
way does it come to an unfinishable sequence of ever new reflection properties. Without this re-
interpretation, the reflection property would remain a contingent, external aspect, which as such 
would not be relevant for a correspondence judgement. Only the – by no means self-evident – re-
interpretation of reflection properties into eigen-properties leads to an infinite progress and thus re-
presents a necessary precondition of antinomic structures.14 As an expression of the reflective acti-
vity of the language subject, the infinite progress is a typically pragmatic phenomenon. 
But is such a re-interpretation not a very arbitrary procedure? Obviously not in the present 
context, because the reference concept ‹non-sc› itself already expresses a reflection-induced cor-
respondence relationship. So for the correspondence judgement it is to be examined whether among 
the eigen-properties in particular a correspondence property is found. Thus the re-interpretation of a 
reflection-induced property into an eigen-property is here dictated by the special meaning content of 
the reference concept itself and in this respect not only obvious, but even inevitable.15  
If the meaning of the reference concept is especially a negative self-correspondence, this 
leads, as we have seen, to a value reversal at the transition from one correspondence property to the 
next: If a given correspondence property is negative on its part, then it is in correspondence with the 
negative reference concept, and thus results in a positive correspondence property. This positive cor-
respondence property in turn is not in correspondence with the negative reference concept and thus 
results in a negative correspondence property. In this way a series of oscillating correspondence 
properties is generated. 
Decisive for this is obviously the special nature of the reference concept used here, the pecu-
liarities of which will be discussed in detail in chapter 6. Initially essential is only that in the present 
context it is centrally about the correspondence relation between reference term and property, whe-
reby the meaning of the reference term itself expresses such a relation between reference concept 
                                                 
13 The structure of a negative self-condition has been explained above with the technical example of a self nega-
tion circuit. The analogy can now be further extended: The content of the reference concept here obviously corresponds 
to the specific switching structure with closed switches. The input, which causes this circuit state, is then 'in accordance' 
with the 'meaning' of the circuit, and the corresponding output has accordingly a positive character. The here considered 
circuit now contains a negation circuit, technically a so called 'rest contact switch', which is closed in absence of an in-
put, in other words: If the input is negative, there is a correspondence with the 'meaning' of the circuit and consequently 
a positive output; this corresponds to the value reversal of the correspondence evaluation with a negative reference term. 
If the output is returned to the input in the sense of the assumed self-negation circuit, the structure of negative self-
condition is realized, i.e. the output oscillates between opposite states. 
14 Note that from such a re-interpretation always an infinite progression of corresponding determinations results – 
also in the non-antinomic case: Thus, for example, the non-antinomic scheme (4.1) can be continued ad infinitum, be-
cause the reflection term 'self-corresponding' is in turn not in correspondence with the reference concept 'multisyllabic' 
and the word 'multisyllabic' is thus (even also) not self-corresponding. This new determination of correspondence is, for 
its part, not in correspondence with 'multisyllabic', and so on, i.e., from the second correspondence judgement on here 
results an admittedly infinite, but ultimately stable sequence of non-correspondence terms, while the sequence in the an-
tinomic case oscillates (because of the constant value reversal in case of a negative reference concept). The infinite pro-
gression of correspondence terms and even the sporadic occurrence of opposite correspondence terms is therefore not 
sufficient for the existence of an antinomic structure. 
15 The Carnapian concept of the mixing of spheres, with which T. Kesselring in 1984 (see p. 103, 374) apparently 
tries to characterize exactly this re-interpretation, is somewhat misleading in this respect: as if it were merely a subjecti-
ve oversight, an error of reasoning. A. Kulenkampff 1970 (p. 20) also uses this term, but obviously not for characteri-
zing antinomic structures. 
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and property. Thus the relation in question – here in its negative version as non-correspondence – is 
for its part semantically modelled in the reference concept, and in this way determines the cor-
respondence between this reference concept and possible properties.16 It is not difficult to see that a 
feedback arises, as it were, which in the case of a negative reference concept constitutes a condition 
structure of the type of a negative self-condition. 
If it is true that this characterizes the basic type of an antinomic structure, then all antinomies 
must be traceable to the given basic scheme. This is to be illustrated in the following only by the ex-
ample of Russell's and the truth antinomy: 
The ('logical') Russell antinomy results from the definition of a set of those sets that do not 
contain themselves. Central is thus the concept of non-self-contained sets, which plays the role of 
the reference concept here. Thus the antinomy results according to the well-known scheme (sc = he-
re: self-containing):  
 
(4.3)  ‹non-sc›/ non-sc  ~~>   non-sc  ~~>   sc  ~~>   non-sc  ~~>  ... 
 
The ('semantical') truth antinomy can be illustrated by the sentence 'This sentence is false'.17 
The reference concept is here a term, which – according to the self-reference of that sentence – can 
be described as non-self-truth. The antinomic scheme thus has the form: 
 
(4.4) ‹non-self-true›/ non-self-true  ~~>   non-self-true  ~~>   self-true  ~~>  non-self-true  ~~>  ... 
 
Both examples show that the antinomic structure is not always obvious. Often an analysis of 
the conceptual relations has to be done first to find the relevant reference concept. The primary 
structures themselves (here the element-set-relation or the non-self-truth statement) may at first lead 
to a formal contradiction, whereby the sequence of the reflection-induced correspondence properties 
– essentially for antinomic structures – remains hidden. At the same time it has become clear that 
the usual distinction of logical and semantic antinomies remains on the surface, since for the occur-
rence of antinomies, as has been shown, solely the structure of the reference term is decisive,18 not 
linguistic details. 
 
5. Generalisation of the antinomic basic structure 
 
The antinomic structure considered in the previous section resulted from the correspondence 
of a linguistic entity (word, sentence, etc.) with respect to a reference concept of the kind of a non-
self-correspondence. By dissolution of linguistic forms, the antinomic structure becomes even more 
apparent. Let ‹S› be the concept of non-equivalence with ‹S› itself, ‹S› = ‹non-‹S›-corresponding›. 
With this reference concept a new, generalized antinomy can now be formulated, schematically 
(with 'cp' as abbreviation for 'corresponding'): 
 
(5.1)  ‹S› = ‹non-‹S›-cp›:  entity / non-‹S›-cp  ~~>   ‹S›-cp  ~~>   non-‹S›-cp  ~~>  ... 
                                                 
16 T. Kesselring's distinction of "basic function" and "superfunction" (1984, p. 106) apparently represents a paral-
lel to the characterized correspondence between the reference concept and the correspondence relationship. If this is 
true, then Kesselring should not say, however, that the negation of self-relation, which is decisive for antinomy, can be 
achieved either by negating the basis function or the superfunction (ibid.). Because in fact the antinomy only occurs, if 
the reference concept expresses a negation of self-relation. 
17 Gödel's problem of the incompleteness of (sufficiently expressive, consistent) formal systems is similar to the 
truth antinomy. Admittedly an antinomy is avoided by replacing the predicate 'false' in the given antinomic proposition 
by 'unprovable'. The so obtained proposition 'this proposition is unprovable' is then, although strictly unprovable, ne-
vertheless provable as necessarily true and the system, in which it is formulated, is accordingly qualified as 'incomplete'. 
For this in detail D. Wandschneider 1979(b). 
18 More on that in chapter 6. 
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 It is remarkable, that with reference to the concept ‹S› = ‹non-‹S›-corresponding› obviously 
any entity has antinomic oscillating properties! Indeed: Even and just if the entity directly has 
nothing ‹S›-corresponding it corresponds exactly to the relation of not being 'S'- corresponding, 
which contentwise means ‹S›. And with this ‹S›-correspondence in relation to ‹non-‹S›-
corresponding› immediately again non-correspondence with ‹S› is implicated, and so on. Nothing in 
heaven and on earth, so one could say, can escape this obtrusive friend-enemy relation with respect 
to ‹S›. It exists completely independent of the nature of an entity and is therefore based only on the 
special peculiarity of the reference concept ‹S›. This will be discussed in detail later.  
Beforehand, an interesting practical interpretation of the generalized antinomic structure may 
be pointed out: If the reference concept ‹S› of the non-‹S›-correspondence is interpreted as norm 
and the correspondence with ‹S› as obedience with respect to this norm, one has the case of a para-
doxical norm, which demands disobedience with respect to this norm itself with the consequence 
that obedience with respect to this norm is disobedience and disobedience with respect to the norm 
is obedience, schematically (with 'ob' as abbreviation for 'obedient'): 
 
(5.2)  ‹S› = ‹non-‹S›-ob› : behavior / non-‹S›-ob  ~~>   ‹S›-ob  ~~>   non-‹S›-ob  ~~>  ...  
 
That this behavioral interpretation of the antinomic structure has concrete relevance is shown 
by the so-called double-bind phenomenon in the sense of contradictory behavioral attitudes, which 
is well known in psychology and discussed by G. Bateson. Responsible for this phenomenon are 
contradictory (partly non-verbally conveyed) commandments such as 'Do not obey me', 'Do not li-
sten to my advice' etc.19 The fact that these are not only ambivalent, but actually antinomic demands 
makes their disastrous psychological consequences seem understandable: Concerning the norm ‹S› 
one cannot behave correctly, because every norm compliance here necessarily is at the same time a 
norm violation. The reason for this is the pragmatic contradiction contained in the norm, which can 
be diagnosed here again: The norm ‹S› contentwise contains the demand of norm non-compliance, 
which is incompatible with its formal characteristic of being a norm. That one must necessarily be-
have contradictorily in the face of such a norm has its reason not in the behavior, but solely in the 
paradoxality of the norm to which the behavior is related. Behavior can therefore in principle free 
itself from this contradiction not by changing behavior, but only by abolishing the norm. The paral-
lel to the just stated fact is to be recognized here: that any entity, completely independent of its own 
constitution, shows antinomic correspondence properties concerning the reference concept ‹S›. The-
se are not due to it per se, but only by the act of referring to ‹S› – again a typical pragmatic pheno-
menon. This paradox, which is founded in the nature of the antinomic term itself, will now be ex-
amined in the following. 
 
6. The antinomic concept: the nub of the matter 
 
Insight regarding the peculiarities of the concept ‹S› = ‹not-‹S›-corresponding› results from 
the consideration, that the property S, defined by ‹S›, is the property 'not-‹S›-corresponding', but S 
on the other hand, because defined by ‹S›, can be characterized as the opposite property '‹S›-
corresponding', too – this will be discussed later. S thus appears as a property contradicting in itself 
or, with a word of Hegel, as the other of itself.20 And accordingly this is valid for the concept ‹S› it-
self.  
This must be surprising. In the previous example it was found at first, that any entity has con-
                                                 
19 See G. Bateson 1985, p. 276 f. I would like to thank V. Hösle for the reference to the double-bind phenome-
non. 
20 G.W.F. Hegel 1969, 127. See the instructive example in T. Kesselring 1984, p. 291. An impression of the rich-
ness of relationships in such a structure is given by the subtle argumentations in D. Henrich 1978, esp. p. 218 ff. 
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tradicting correspondence properties relating to the concept ‹S› = ‹not-‹S›-corresponding›, whereby 
meaning of ‹S› itself seemed to be fixed. But as it now turns out, this conception cannot be maintai-
ned. Not only the reflection-induced correspondence properties of an entity relating to ‹S› is contra-
dictory, but ‹S› itself represents a contradictory meaning, namely, as will be shown, as a contradic-
tory opposition of semantic and pragmatic meaning. 
Let us first consider for comparison purposes another term, ‹Q› = ‹non-‹R›-corresponding›, 
which expresses non-correspondence with the reference concept ‹R›, where furthermore it is assu-
med, that ‹R› has an own meaning independent from ‹Q› and thus is semantically founded. But for 
the antinomic notion ‹S› = ‹not-‹S›-corresponding› this condition is not fulfilled any more, because 
in the meaning of ‹S› there is a reference to ‹S› itself, i.e. ‹S› is self-referential in content and thus 
semantically unfounded. ‹Q› is a well-founded, semantically fixed correspondence concept, while 
‹S› is an unfounded, semantically open21 correspondence concept. 
This indeterminacy becomes immediately visible, if the notion ‹S› = ‹not-‹S›-corresponding›, 
which is possible due to its contentual self-referentiality, is inserted into itself – the steps in detail 
(considering the property S, which is assigned to ‹S›, for simplicity):  
 
(6.1)  S = non-‹S›-corresponding = non-‹non-‹S›-corresponding›-corresponding  
 
(6.2)    ‹non-‹S›-corresponding›-corresponding = non-‹S›-corresponding 
 
Here by the partial expression ‘‹non-‹S›-corresponding›-corresponding’ the property corresponding 
to the notion ‹non-‹S›-corresponding›, i.e. the property 'non-‹S›-corresponding' is characterized 
(more about this later): Hence: 
 
(6.3)  S = non-‹S›-corresponding = non-(non-‹S›-corresponding) = ‹S›-corresponding 
 
S = non-‹S›-corresponding has turned into ‹S›-corresponding by inserting ‹non-‹S›-corresponding› 
for ‹S›. A further insertion (using (6.2)) results in 
 
(6.4)  S = ‹S›-corresponding = ‹non-‹S›-corresponding ›-corresponding  = non-‹S›-corresponding,  
 
which is again the initial expression. In total therefore: 
 
(6.5) S = non-‹S›-corresponding = ‹S›-corresponding = non-‹S›-corresponding = ... 
 
This procedure can be continued at pleasure, and with every substitution a further negation is intro-
duced, so that every specification of S or ‹S› cancels out and changes into its opposite. The antino-
mic concept ‹S› thus indeed proves to be the other of itself (see above), that becomes visible by self-
insertion in such a way that it alternately appears in opposite forms – manifestation of a negative 
self-condition on the semantic level. 
This peculiarity of contradictory meanings of ‹S› is now to be examined in more detail. Obvi-
ously this is not a semantically contradictory term of the kind 'black white-horse'. Rather, as will be-
come apparent, a pragmatic contradiction is to be diagnosed once again. In this context the previous 
consideration (see (6.2)) has to be remembered, according to which the property S, regardless of its 
semantic determination, can always be characterized as the ‹S›-corresponding property, too, because 
S is finally only determined by recourse to the S defining concept ‹S›. 
In general it can be said that a property P can be characterized in two ways: semantically di-
rectly by the meaning characterizing ‹P›, pragmatically indirectly as the property corresponding to 
‹P›, namely due to the act of reflection on the correspondence between property and concept, P and 
                                                 
21 See also F. von Kutschera 1964, p. 54 f. 
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‹P›, which was already characterized in the chapter 4 as a pragmatic reflection property with respect 
to the reference concept. The identification of the ontic property P by the pragmatic reflection pro-
perty '‹P›-corresponding' corresponds to the re-interpretation of a reflection property into an eigen-
property of the considered entity (see ch.4). 
Note that the semantic and the pragmatic P-variant are identifications of the same property P 
and do not only represent different 'views' of it. It could be objected, that the pragmatic identificati-
on '‹P›-corresponding' is not the property P itself, but only a property of the property P: the property 
to be in correspondence with ‹P›. This is correct on the one hand; but on the other hand it is true, 
that this property '‹P›-corresponding' is used exclusively for the property P as defining condition. 
Therefore e.g. '‹red›-corresponding' can be replaced by 'red' in all contexts and vice versa, but not by 
'bloody'. Indeed 'bloody' is ‹red›-corresponding, too, but it is not at all a definition of 'bloody' to cor-
respond to the concept ‹red›. 
From a fundamental perspective, the following can be seen here: The pragmatic variant '‹P›-
corresponding' of the property P is based on a general property of concepts: The concept ‹P› deter-
mines the property P, which is thereby inversely in correspondence with ‹P›, in other words: Every 
concept is pragmatically related to itself by the property determined by it and thus constitutes a 
pragmatic-reflexive structure. ‹P› is only thereby concept, that it defines something as something, 
which as such is again a ‹P› corresponding entity. The possibility of pragmatic reflexivity is thus ba-
sed on the fact that the meaning of a concept is essentially something general, which, as a general, 
is in its instances similar to itself (cf. the considerations in chapter 3). Here a fundamental difference 
of meaning and property becomes visible: The meaning is not only determined (like tables and 
chairs), but it is the generality of being determined (like the concept of the table, the chair, etc.), 
which in this way implicates equality of the general with itself in its instances and in this pragmatic 
sense reflexivity.22  
In the present context, four types of reflexive structures can be distinguished: (1) the previous-
ly characterized pragmatic reflexivity of concepts; (2) semantic reflexivity in the sense of content-
related self-referentiality, whereby in the meaning of a concept is referred to this meaning itself, e.g. 
as in the case of the antinomic concept ‹S› = ‹not-‹S›-corresponding›; (3) a form which may be cal-
led ontic reflexivity and which is given when a concept itself actually possesses the property it signi-
fies – e.g. in the case of the concept ‹predicate›, which is itself a predicate; (4) the already explained 
structure of negative self-condition or, in linguistic form, of the vicious circle (see chapter 3). Signi-
ficantly, as far as I can see, these types of reflexivity have not yet been differentiated in the investi-
gations of the antinomy problem. The concept of 'self-referentiality', which in this context – in prin-
ciple rightly – has been brought to the fore,23 is therefore far too imprecise and in this respect more 
likely to obscure the problem than to illuminate it. That the exact differentiation of the different ty-
pes of reflexivity is indispensable for the clarification of the antinomy problem will be shown in the 
following. 
Two consequences result directly from the preceding considerations: That for a property P be-
side the semantic reflexivity there is also the pragmatic identification '‹P›-corresponding', is obvi-
ously based on the pragmatic reflexivity of the concept ‹P›. At the same time it is clear that the 
pragmatic identification, as affirmative correspondence of the property with the concept defining it, 
is always positively determined, i.e. also in the case of a concept which is negative in content.24  
From this point of view it is now also clear, why the concept ‹S› = ‹non-‹S›-corresponding› 
has contradictory identifications, and therefore is antinomic: Simply because besides the negative 
semantic variant there always equivalently exists the positive pragmatic variant ‹S› = ‹‹S›-
                                                 
22 For this see G.W.F. Hegel 1969, p. 251 f, 274 f, where these connections, as far as I see, are clearly recognized 
and formulated for the first time. 
23 E.g. T. Kesselring 1984, S. 104 ff. 
24 Cf. the considerations in the chapter 3, according to which having-a-meaning of a concept always constitutes 
positivity. 
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corresponding›. This is thus always a positive self-corresponding concept, and the antinomy there-
fore arises exactly when – as here – the semantic variant is a negative self-corresponding concept. It 
is the contradiction in ‹S› itself, which is based on the fact that the negative semantic definition of 
‹S› contradicts what is positively pragmatically presupposed by the concept ‹S› qua concept. It is 
exactly this pragmatic fact, which always again has been overlooked, that – in the special case of a 
non-self-corresponding concept – leads to the occurrence of the antinomic structure. That's the nub 
of the matter! 
This means at the same time, that here both ‹S›-variants necessarily coexist, i.e. for a given 
concept it is not possible to accept only the semantic variant and perhaps drop the pragmatic variant. 
Although in the present case both are incompatible, they are nevertheless indispensable. This con-
firms the earlier observation that the antinomic contradiction is a kind of true contradiction, as it 
were, which makes the aporetic character of the antinomic structure comprehensible. This will be 
discussed in chapter 8. 
In addition, the pragmatic contradiction as such is a covert contradiction, insofar as an unex-
plained, extra-semantic precondition (the pragmatic-reflexive structure of the concept) becomes es-
sential here. A contradictory identification on the semantic level – example: 'black white-horse' – 
would be obvious and easily recognizable as absurd, while the concept ‹S› = ‹non-‹S›-
corresponding› appears prima vista innocuous.25 Admittedly, after it has been shown that ‹‹S›-
corresponding› is the pragmatic variant of ‹S›, the latent contradiction also becomes visible, because 
the semantic variant ‹S› = ‹non-‹S›-corresponding› contains the pragmatic variant. Both are opposi-
te and yet equally identifications of ‹S›.  
It is obvious that the function of reflexive structures for the occurrence of antinomies has to be 
judged much more differentiated than previous opinions suggest. Not only do four forms of reflexi-
vity have to be distinguished in this context; it is also apparent that they are peculiarly intertwined 
with each other. In conclusion, this is to be once more recalled: What is initially striking is the con-
tent-related self-referentiality of ‹S› = ‹non-‹S›-corresponding›. In order to bring the semantic refle-
xivity to bear already in the formulation, the originally used expression of the non-self-reference can 
be used, whereby, however, the ambiguity of the 'self' contained in it is to be considered: With re-
spect to an independently determined, i.e. well-founded concept ‹C›, ‹non-self-corresponding› 
means as much as ‹non-existence of an ontic reflexivity of ‹C›› (for instance that the concept ‹red› is 
not itself red). This well-founded use of ‹non-self-corresponding› does not lead to antinomies, as we 
know. The concept becomes antinomic only in case of semantic self-referentiality, because it loses 
its foundation. Now 'self' refers to the concept of non-self-correspondence itself. This means, just as 
in the well-founded case, ‹non-existence of an ontic reflexivity›, but now no longer for a term diffe-
rent from it, but for itself, so that semantic reflexivity is given, i.e. the negation of ontic reflexivity is 
here, which is well to be considered, at the same time realization of semantic reflexivity. In addition, 
the antinomic concept, as explained above, also has the general pragmatic reflexivity of the concept 
as a concept. Now, the positive pragmatic variant ‹self-corresponding› of the antinomic concept 
again and again can be translated into the negative semantic variant and replaced by it ('self-
insertion'). In this way, in addition to the forms of reflexivity already mentioned, a reflective structu-
re of the negative self-condition type is also realized on the semantic level (vicious circle), and the 
contradiction of both variants is thus disassambled into an infinite sequence of self-negations. The 
semantic reflexivity of the antinomic concept thus also appears as a reflection process in the form of 
iterated self-negation or, in short, as an iterative self-reference of negation.26  
All these aspects can be seen in the one seemingly innocuous concept, which formulates a ne-
                                                 
25 When W. Gölz 1986 (p. 12 f) points out that the (truth) antinomy is based on a contradictory definition, it must 
be added that the contradiction here is just not of semantic but of a combined semantic-pragmatic nature. The semantic 
analysis alone can therefore never detect inconsistency, but only "senselessness" – in the sense of unfoundedness. 
26 Here again to the differentiated, continuative considerations (especially with reference to Hegelian thought fi-
gures) in D. Henrich 1978 (esp. p. 218 ff, 223 f) should be pointed out. 
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gative correspondence between corresponding properties and the concept, which it is itself, on the 
semantic level. The astonishing variety of relations connected with this makes the irritation that has 
always emanated from the antinomy problem appear more comprehensible. This multiple ambiguity 
of the antinomic concept, as has now become clear, is based not least on the fact that here quite dif-
ferent structures of reflexivity – ontic, semantic, pragmatic reflexivity, and especially the form of 
negative self-condition – are intertwined in the singular case of this particular unfounded concept in 
a way that is difficult to understand and thus lead to abnormal ('true') contradictions. 
It was important to gain clarity about the nature of the antinomic concept itself, because this is 
actually the key to understanding antinomic phenomena. Incidentally, it would appear that many 
things can be learned from such analyses concerning the 'depth structure' of the concept, even if it is 
not possible to pursue further questions here (but see chapter 8). 
 
 7. Pragmatic27 extensions 
 
 The antinomic term ‹S› itself, as has been shown, contains a pragmatic contradiction of the 
semantic and pragmatic variant. This contradiction is disassambled by the reflective activity of the 
language subject into a sequence of alternating meanings of ‹S› respectively changing judgements of 
correspondence relating ‹S›. In such oscillations – as it were the trace of this reflective activity – on-
ly the characteristic of language becomes particularly drastically apparent: namely, that the executi-
on of language itself can also have a constitutive function of meaning, that is, the pragmatic dimen-
sion of language. 
With the form of self-referentiality contained in the antinomic concept ‹S›, the pragmatics of 
the linguistic action comes into focus. From this point of view, a term like ‹S›, whose meaning con-
sists essentially of linguistic self-reference, could be called an essentially pragmatic concept. Its 
meaning is nothing but pure reflection on this very reflection or a form of self-reflection (characteri-
zed as non-self-reference). The meaning of ‹S› is thus not fixed, but demands an act of self-
reflection that immediately provokes a new self-reflection, etc. The preceding considerations must 
therefore not be understood as if the linguistic reflection on ‹S› was an act of external reference to a 
fixed, predetermined concept. This is not possible because of the unfoundedness of ‹S›. Rather, ‹S› 
is, if understood correctly, nothing other than pure self-reflection, quasi pure linguistic action and, 
in this respect, a thoroughly pragmatic concept with merely rudimentary elements of meaning ('not', 
'corresponding'), which, as has been shown, are necessary but by no means sufficient for the specifi-
cally antinomical effect. 
Such a fundamentally pragmatic structure, which as such is essentially characterized by self-
reflection, possibly also opens up an approach to the problem of self-consciousness and thus the 
ego, which can only be hinted at here: A fundamental difficulty of the concept of the ego has again 
and again been seen in that the ego for its part is to be determined as pure self-reference, whereby 
the 'self' presumed for it is on the other hand already presupposed as ego, that for its part is to be 
grasped as self-reference, etc.28 The self is in this way not comprehensible as a fixed, substantial in-
stance, but only as a relation to itself, and thus further as 'a relation that relates to itself,'29 and so on 
and so forth. The ego, too, appears, similarly to ‹S› = ‹not-‹S›-corresponding›, as an unfunded, thus, 
as it were, bottomless, though certainly not strictly antinomic structure.30  
Interesting in this sense is the positive counterpart of ‹S›, i.e. ‹R› = ‹‹R›-corresponding›: From 
the assumption of the ‹R›-correspondence of the property R follows, as it were, as self-affirmation, 
                                                 
27 On the concept of pragmatics in detail see H. Stachowiak in PRAGMATICS I, especially on the semiotic con-
cept of pragmatics, p. XXVI ff. 
28 See (with references) D. Wandschneider 1979. 
29 S. Kierkegaard 1978, p. 8. 
30 That on the other hand the development of the ego-consciousness (according to the Piagetian scheme) is driven 
by antinomic contradictions is made likely by the very instructive considerations of T. Kesselring 1984 (3rd chapter). 
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again the reflection-induced property of the ‹R›-correspondence; from the – as we know, pragmati-
cally wrong – assumption of the non-‹R›-correspondence of R, however, an analog 'self-
affirmation', namely of the non-‹R›-correspondence, schematically ('cp' = 'corresponding'): 
 
    
 (7.1) ‹R› = ‹‹R›-cp›:   R/  
  
  
If ‹R› = ‹‹R›-corresponding› now is interpreted in practical respect as self-determination, then 
it results, that its realization at a basically self-determining being (= reference-instance ‹R›) depends 
decisively on the corresponding presupposition: The assumption of self-determination results in 
self-determination of action, the assumption of non-self-determination on the other hand in non-
self-determination. So here we are dealing with a self-fulfilling structure, as it is obviously essential 
for the character of freedom.31  
As you can see, unfounded, self-referential concepts involve completely new properties. If 
such non-standard concepts would be excluded from the linguistic area from the beginning, even 
most remarkable logical structures of fundamental interest would remain hidden. The antinomic 
term ‹S› here considered as well as its positive counterpart ‹R› indeed do not only bring something 
to light concerning the nature of the concept at all, but especially make genuinely pragmatic and 
even behavior-theoretical aspects visible. 
 
8. Remarks on dialectics 
 
I conclude with a look at the broad and still largely unexplored field of dialectics. In modern 
philosophy, the problem is connected above all with the name of Hegel, who understands dialectic 
as a logic of development and interdependence of concepts. Hegel himself practiced this procedure 
in a virtuoso manner, but to this day, apart from initial approaches,32 a satisfactory theory of dialec-
tics is still missing. On the other hand, the affinity of the antinomy problem with the problem of dia-
lectic has been repeatedly emphasized.33 What can be said to this relating to the conception develo-
ped here, shall be explained finally by the example of the dialectic of 'being' and 'nothing', whereby 
the argumentation here differs from Hegel's (at the beginning of his Science of Logic), but in the re-
sult it agrees with it. 
Why Hegel starts with the term ‹being› is not to be discussed here. Essential in the present 
context is only that, according to dialectical understanding, the concept ‹being› is delimited against 
that, what ‹being› does not mean, and that is, according to Hegel, the term ‹nothing› or, as seems 
more appropriate to me for reasons not to be discussed here either, the term ‹non-being›. So, with 
‹B› (for ‹being›) and ‹N› (for ‹non-being›): 
 
 (8.1)  ‹B› = ‹non-N›. 
 
But this means too: ‹B› is not ‹N›, and this 'is not' shows, that the notion ‹B› itself possesses the 
property denoted by ‹N›, in other words: 
 
(8.2) ‹B› is ‹N›-corresponding. 
 
                                                 
31 See D. Wandschneider 1979, esp. ch. VII u. VIII. 
32 In this regard, only the works of H. F. Fulda, D. Henrich and W. Wieland in: R.-P. Horstmann 1978, as well as 
T. Kesselring 1984, V. Hösle 1987 (chapter 4.1), D. Wandschneider 1995 may be mentioned. 
33 E.g. A. Kulenkampff 1970, p. 2; T. Kesselring 1984, § 5; D. Wandschneider 1995. 
non-‹R›-cp  ~~>   non-‹R›-cp  ~~>   ... 
‹R›-cp  ~~>   ‹R›-cp  ~~>   ... 
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According to this 'is' now the property 'being', which is characterized by ‹B›, must be ascribed to ‹B› 
itself, and so we have: ‹B› is ‹B›-corresponding or, inasmuch as ‹B› is not‹N›, 
 
 (8.3) ‹B› is not ‹N›-corresponding. 
 
Because of this 'is not', ‹B› is again ‹N›-corresponding etc.: As can be seen, the term ‹B› can in this 
way be assigned alternately the contradictory predicates '‹N›-corresponding' and 'non-‹N›-
corresponding', so that an antinomic structure is given, from which now, in the sense of the argu-
ment developed above, it must be concluded on an underlying antinomic reference concept ‹N›: 
 
 (8.4)  ‹N› = ‹non-‹N›-corresponding› 
 
Hereby the transition from the property level ('‹N›-corresponding', 'non-‹N›-corresponding') to the 
conceptual level (‹non-‹N›-corresponding› in angle brackets!) is performed – a step, which is also 
done by Hegel again and again, but remains unfounded there. Now according to the considerations 
above ‹N›-corresponding = N, and so ‹non-‹N›-corresponding› = ‹non-N›= ‹B› (8.1), so that (8.4) 
finally changes to  
 
(8.5)   ‹B› = ‹N›.  
 
This contradiction to (8.1) would normally be understood as reductio ad absurdum of the un-
derlying premise (8.1) with the consequence that this premise would have to be abandoned. But this 
is not possible in the present context, because the delimitation against ‹N›, constitutive for  ‹B›, is 
indispensable. So if (8.1) is accepted, then also the resulting consequence (8.5) has to be accepted, 
or in other words: The strict opposition of ‹B› and ‹N› in (8.1) is as one-sided as the equality of both 
in (8.5). Opposition and equality must rather be understood as necessarily belonging together and 
the expression  
 
 (8.6)  ( ‹B› = ‹non-N›)    ( ‹B› = ‹N›), 
 
even though contradictory, nevertheless as true! The original opposition of the concepts ‹B› and ‹N› 
has been transformed into a contradiction, but into an antinomic contradiction, which had been cha-
racterized as a true contradiction before. 
The presence of the antinomic element in dialectical conceptual relations gives this strange 
fact central importance for the understanding of dialectics. At the same time, it is clear that the con-
tradiction qualified as true cannot be a normal conjunction in such a way that the truth of the sub-
sentences, taken individually, could be inferred from it,34 i.e. in the antinomic case the separation 
rule is no longer valid for the conjunction. This fact can indeed suggest the idea of a stage order, 
where the opposite becomes understandable on the one hand as coexistent, but on the other hand (on 
different stages) as different. However, this is indeed a formally elegant, but strictly speaking a spa-
tializing or temporalizing interpretation35 of a more fundamental fact, which could be more aptly 
characterized as unity of opposites. 'Unity' because in the antinomic case, as said, none of the oppo-
site relations can be without the other, so that both are only useful in their conjunction at all and 
therefore not are separable from each other. Hegel has called this unity of opposites – with an ex-
pression that is repeatedly misunderstood – "the speculative".36 The often criticized 'suspension of 
the principle of contradiction' in dialecticis thus gains a quite comprehensible meaning in the per-
                                                 
34 G.W.F. Hegel 1969, p. 94; see also V. Hösle 1987, sect. 4.1.1.1. 
35 Think of the explained example of a  self-acting interrupter  (chapter 3). 
36 Hegel 1969, p. 52 In this context one can also think of the coincidentia oppositorum of Cusanus. (Cf. N. He-
rold in PRAGMATIK I, p. 302.) 
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spective of the antinomic problem. There can be no question of allowing the contradiction, under-
stood as a normal conjunction of contradictory sentences. For here, what is known to be disastrous 
in the logic of argumentation,37 must not be concluded on the isolated subsentences of the conjunc-
tion. 
And finally: The circumstance that both sub-sentences, ‹B› = ‹non-N› and ‹B› = ‹N›, have to 
be regarded as inseparably belonging together, further necessitates the introduction of a new, synthe-
tic concept, in which both aspects are connected, which thus leads to the concept of ‹being, which is 
not simply non-being, but is non-being as well› and (in modification of the Hegelian sequence of 
concepts) is to be interpreted as ‹being-there› in the sense of a qualitatively different being. Notice 
here that the opposition of ‹B› and ‹N›, which appeared first, did not contain the slightest occasion 
for a synthetic unification of both – opposite concepts have as such a good sense, which does not 
require to go beyond it. Rather, the necessity of the synthesis arises only from the proven transfor-
mation of the opposition into a contradiction, especially an antinomic contradiction, which 'welds' 
the opposition into a new unity. 
 These hints – it is not more than this – may suffice here. It is obvious that in this context many 
questions remain open (e.g. concerning the easily understandable asymmetry of ‹B› and ‹N›, con-
cerning their modification of meaning by the synthesis or also concerning the consequences resul-
ting from the synthesis), which required a separate investigation. But one can safely say, that the 
sense of dialectic remains dark, as long as the peculiar antinomic structures are not understood. The 
clarification of these antinomic determinations is therefore not only a valuable contribution to the 
understanding of pragmatic language structures, but also of deeper dialectical-logical relationships. 
                                                 
37 See e.g. K. R. Popper 1976. 
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